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Abstract
Cox's well-known theorem justifying the use of probability is shown not to hold in
nite domains. The counterexample also suggests that Cox's assumptions are insucient
to prove the result even in innite domains. The same counterexample is used to disprove
a result of Fine on comparative conditional probability.
1. Introduction
One of the best-known and seemingly most compelling justications of the use of probability
is given by Cox (1946). Suppose we have a function Bel that associates a real number with
each pair (U; V ) of subsets of a domainW such that U 6= ;. We write Bel(V jU) rather than
Bel(U; V ), since we think of Bel(V jU) as the credibility or likelihood of V given U .
1
Cox
further assumes that Bel(V jU) is a function of Bel(V jU) (where V denotes the complement
of V in W ), that is, there is a function S such that
A1. Bel(V jU) = S(Bel(V jU)) if U 6= ;,
and that Bel(V \ V
0
jU) is a function of Bel(V
0
jV \ U) and Bel(V jU), that is, there is a
function F such that
A2. Bel(V \ V
0
jU) = F (Bel(V
0
jV \ U);Bel(V jU)) if V \ U 6= ;.
Notice that if Bel is a probability function, then we can take S(x) = 1 x and F (x; y) =
xy. Cox makes much weaker assumptions: he assumes that F is twice dierentiable, with a
continuous second derivative, and that S is twice dierentiable. Under these assumptions,
he shows that Bel is isomorphic to a probability distribution in the sense that there is a
continuous one-to-one onto function g : IR! IR such that gBel is a probability distribution
on W , and
g(Bel(V jU)) g(Bel(U)) = g(Bel(V \ U)) if U 6= ;, (1)
where Bel(U) is an abbreviation for Bel(U jW ).
Not surprisingly, Cox's result has attracted a great deal of interest, particularly in the
maximum entropy community and, more recently, in the AI community. For example
1. Cox writes V jU rather than Bel(V jU), and takes U and V to be propositions in some language rather
than events, i.e., subsets of a given set. This dierence is minor|there are well-known mappings from
propositions to events, and vice versa. I use events here since they are more standard in the probability
literature.
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 Cheeseman (1988) has called it the \strongest argument for use of standard (Bayesian)
probability theory". Similar sentiments are expressed by Jaynes (1978, p. 24); indeed,
Cox's Theorem is one of the cornerstones of Jaynes' recent book (1996).
 Horvitz, Heckerman, and Langlotz (1986) used it as a basis for comparison of proba-
bility and other nonprobabilistic approaches to reasoning about uncertainty.
 Heckerman (1988) used it as a basis for providing an axiomatization for belief update.
The main contribution of this paper is to show (by means of an explicit counterexample)
that Cox's result does not hold in nite domains, even under strong assumptions on S and
F (stronger than those made by Cox and those made in all papers proving variants of Cox's
results). Since nite domains are arguably those of most interest in AI applications, this
suggests that arguments for using probability based on Cox's result|and other justications
similar in spirit|must be taken with a grain of salt, and their proofs carefully reviewed.
Moreover, the counterexample suggests that Cox's assumptions are insucient to prove the
result even in innite domains.
It is known that some assumptions regarding F and S must be made to prove Cox's
result. Dubois and Prade (1990) give an example of a function Bel, dened on a nite
domain, that is not isomorphic to a probability distribution. For this choice of Bel, we can
take F (x; y) = min(x; y) and S(x) = 1   x. Since min is not twice dierentiable, Cox's
assumptions block the Dubois-Prade example.
Other authors have made dierent assumptions. Aczel (1966, Section 7 (Theorem 1))
does not make any assumptions about F , but he does make two other assumptions, each
of which block the Dubois-Prade example. The rst is that the Bel(V jU) takes on every
value in some range [e;E], with e < E. In the Dubois-Prade example, the domain is nite,
so this certainly cannot hold. The second is that if V and V
0
are disjoint, then there is a
continuous function G : IR
2
! IR, strictly increasing in each argument, such that
A3. Bel(V [ V
0
jU) = G(Bel(V jU);Bel(V
0
jU)).
With these assumptions, he gives a proof much in the spirit of that of Cox to show that Bel
is essentially a probability distribution. Dubois and Prade point out that, in their example,
there is no function G satisfying A3 (even if we drop the requirement that G be continuous
and strictly increasing in each argument).
2
Reichenbach (1949) earlier proved a result similar to Aczel's, under somewhat stronger
assumptions. In particular, he assumed A3, with G being +.
Other variants of Cox's result have also been considered in the literature. For example,
Heckerman (1988) and Horvitz, Heckerman, and Langlotz (1986) assume that F is contin-
uous and strictly increasing in each argument and S is continuous and strictly decreasing.
Since min is not strictly continuous in each argument, it fails this restriction too.
3
Aleliunas
(1988) gives yet another collection of assumptions and claims that they suce to guarantee
that Bel is essentially a probability distribution.
2. In fact, Aczel allows there to be a dierent function G
U
for each set U on the right-hand side of the
conditional. However, the Dubois-Prade example does not even satisfy this weaker condition.
3. Actually, the restriction that F be strictly increasing in each argument is a little too strong. If e = Bel(;),
then it can be shown that F (e; x) = F (x; e) = e for all x, so that F is not strictly increasing if one of its
arguments is e.
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The rst to observe potential problems with Cox's result is Paris (1994). As he puts
it, \Cox's proof is not, perhaps, as rigorous as some pedants might prefer and when an
attempt is made to ll in all the details some of the attractiveness of the original is lost."
Paris provides a rigorous proof of the result, assuming that the range of Bel is contained
in [0; 1] and using assumptions similar to those of Horvitz, Heckerman, and Langlotz. In
particular, he assumes that F is continuous and strictly increasing in (0; 1]
2
and that S is
decreasing. However, he makes use of one additional assumption that, as he himself says,
is not very appealing:
A4. For all 0  ; ;   1 and  > 0, there are sets U
1
 U
2
 U
3
 U
4
such that U
3
6= ;,
and each of jBel(U
4
jU
3
)  j, jBel(U
3
jU
2
)  j, and jBel(U
2
jU
1
)  j is less than .
Notice that this assumption forces the range of Bel to be dense in [0; 1]. This means that,
in particular, the domain W on which Bel is dened cannot be nite.
Is this assumption really necessary? Paris suggests that Aczel needs something like it.
(This issue is discussed in further detail below.) The counterexample of this paper gives
further evidence. It shows that Cox's result fails in nite domains, even if we assume that
the range of Bel is in [0; 1], S(x) = 1 x (so that, in particular, S is twice dierentiable and
monotonically decreasing), G(x; y) = x + y, and F is innitely dierentiable and strictly
increasing on (0; 1]
2
. We can further assume that F is commutative, F (0; x) = F (x; 0) = 0,
and that F (x; 1) = F (1; x) = x. The example emphasizes the point that the applicability
of Cox's result is far narrower than was previously believed. It remains an open question
as to whether there is an appropriate strengthening of the assumptions that does give us
Cox's result in nite settings. There is further discussion of this issue in Section 5.
In fact, the example shows even more. In the course of his proof, Cox claims to show
that F must be an associative function, that is, that F (x; F (y; z)) = F (F (x; y); z). For the
Bel of the counterexample, there can be no associative function F satisfying A2. It is this
observation that is the key to showing that there is no probability distribution isomorphic
to Bel.
What is going on here? Actually, Cox's proof just shows that F (x; F (y; z)) = F (F (x; y); z)
only for those triples (x; y; z) such that, for some sets U
1
, U
2
, U
3
, and U
4
, we have
x = Bel(U
4
jU
3
\ U
2
\ U
1
), y = Bel(U
3
jU
2
\ U
1
), and z = Bel(U
2
jU
1
). If the set of such
triples (x; y; z) is dense in [0; 1]
3
, then we conclude by continuity that F is associative. The
content of A4 is precisely that the set of such triples is dense in [0; 1]
3
. Of course, if W
is nite, we cannot have density. As my counterexample shows, we do not in general have
associativity in nite domains. Moreover, this lack of associativity can result in the failure
of Cox's theorem.
A similar problem seems to exist in Aczel's proof (as already observed by Paris (1994)).
While Aczel's proof does not involve showing that F is associative, it does involve showing
that G is associative. Again, it is not hard to show that G is associative for appropriate
triples, just as is the case for F . But it seems that Aczel also needs an assumption that
guarantees that the appropriate set of triples is dense, and it is not clear that his assumptions
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do in fact guarantee this.
4
As shown in Section 2, the problem also arises in Reichenbach's
proof.
The counterexample to Cox's theorem, with slight modications, can also be used to
show that another well-known result in the literature is not completely correct. In his sem-
inal book on probability and qualitative probability (1973), Fine considers a non-numeric
notion of comparative (conditional) probability, which allows us to say \U given V is at least
as probable as U
0
given V
0
", denoted U jV  U
0
jV
0
. Conditions on  are given that are
claimed to force the existence of (among other things) a function Bel such that U jV  U
0
jV
0
i Bel(U jV )  Bel(U
0
jV
0
) and an associative function F satisfying A2. (This is Theorem
8 of Chapter II in (Fine, 1973).) However, the Bel dened in my counterexample to Cox's
theorem can be used to give a counterexample to this result as well.
Interestingly, this is not the rst time a similar error has been noted in the use of
functional equations. Falmagne (1981) gives another example (in a case involving a utility
model of choice behavior) and mentions that he knows \of at least two similar examples in
the psychological literature".
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section there is a more
detailed discussion of the problem in Cox's proof. The counterexample to Cox's theorem is
given in Section 3. The following section shows that it is also a counterexample to Fine's
theorem. Section 5 concludes with some discussion, particularly of assumptions under which
Cox's theorem might hold.
2. The Problem With Cox's Proof
To understand the problems with Cox's proof, I actually consider Reichenbach's proof,
which is similar in spirit Cox's proof (it is actually even closer to Aczel's proof), but uses
some additional assumptions, which makes it easier to explain in detail. Aczel, Cox, and
Reichenbach all make critical use of functional equations in their proof, and they make the
same (seemingly unjustied) leap at corresponding points in their proofs.
In the notation of this paper, Reichenbach (1949, pp. 65{67) assumes (1) that the range
of Bel(j) is a subset of [0; 1], (2) Bel(V jU) = 1 if U  V , (3) that if V and V
0
are disjoint,
then Bel(V [V
0
jU) = Bel(V jU)+Bel(V
0
jU) (thus, he assumes that A3 holds, with G being
+), and (4) that A2 holds with a function F that is dierentiable. (He remarks that the
result holds even without assumption (4), although the proof is more complicated; Aczel in
fact does not make an assumption like (4).)
Reichenbach's proof proceeds as follows: Replacing V
0
in A2 by V
1
[ V
2
, where V
1
and
V
2
are disjoint, we get that
Bel(V \ (V
1
[ V
2
)jU) = F (Bel(V
1
[ V
2
jV \ U);Bel(V jU)): (2)
Using the fact that G is +, we immediately get
Bel(V \ (V
1
[ V
2
)jU) = Bel(V \ V
1
jU) + Bel(V \ V
2
jU) (3)
4. I should stress that my counterexample is not a counterexample to Aczel's theorem, since he explicitly
assumes that the range of Bel is innite. However, it does point out potential problems with his proof,
and certainly shows that his argument does not apply to nite domains. Aczel is in fact aware of the
problems with his proof [private communication, 1996]. He later proved results in a similar spirit with
the aid of a requirement of nonatomicity (Aczel & Daroczy, 1975, pp. 5{6), which is in fact a stronger
requirement than A4, and thus also requires the domain to be innite.
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and
F (Bel(V
1
[ V
2
jV \ U);Bel(V jU))
= F (Bel(V
1
jV \ U) + Bel(V
2
jV \ U);Bel(V jU))
(4)
Moreover, by A2, we also have, for i = 1; 2,
Bel(V \ V
i
jU) = F (Bel(V \ V
i
jV \ U);Bel(V jU)): (5)
Putting together (2), (3), (4), and (5), we get that
F (Bel(V \ V
1
jV \ U);Bel(V jU)) + F (Bel(V \ V
2
jV \ U);Bel(V jU))
= F (Bel(V \ V
1
jV \ U) + Bel(V \ V
2
jV \ U);Bel(V jU)):
(6)
Taking x = Bel(V \V
1
jV \U), y = Bel(V \ V
2
jV \U), and z = Bel(V jU) in (6), we get
the functional equation
F (x; z) + F (y; z) = F (x+ y; z): (7)
Suppose that we assume (as Reichenbach implicitly does) that this functional equation
holds for all (x; y; z) 2 P = f(x; y; z) 2 [0; 1]
3
: x+y  1g. The rest of the proof now follows
easily. First, taking x = 0 in (7), it follows that
F (0; z) + F (y; z) = F (y; z);
from which we get that
F (0; z) = 0:
Next, x z and let g
z
(x) = F (x; z). Since F is, by assumption, dierentiable, from (7) we
have that
g
0
z
(x) = lim
y!0
(F (x+ y; z)  F (x; z)=y) = lim
y!0
F (y; z)=y:
It thus follows that g
0
z
(x) is a constant, independent of x. Since the constant may depend
on z, there is some function h such that g
0
z
(x) = h(z). Using the fact that F (0; z) = 0,
elementary calculus tells us that
g
z
(x) = F (x; z) = h(z)x:
Using the assumption that for all U; V , we have Bel(V jU) = 1 if U  V , we get that
Bel(V jU) = Bel(V \ V jU) = F (Bel(V jV \ U);Bel(V jU)) = F (1;Bel(V jU)):
Thus, we have that
F (1; z) = h(z) = z:
We conclude that F (x; z) = xz.
Note, however, that this conclusion depends in a crucial way on the assumption that
the functional equation (7) holds for all (x; y; z) 2 P .
5
In fact, all that we can conclude
from (6) is that it holds for all (x; y; z) such that there exist U , V , V
1
, and V
2
, with V
1
and
V
2
disjoint, such that x = Bel(V \ V
1
jV \ U), y = Bel(V \ V
2
jV \ U), and z = Bel(V jU).
5. Actually, using the continuity of F , it suces that the functional equation holds for a set of triples which
is dense in P .
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Let us say that a triple that satises this condition is R-constrained (since it must satisfy
certain constraints imposed by the F and G functions; the R here is for Reichenbach, to
distinguish this notion from a similar one dened in the next section.) As I mentioned
earlier, Aczel also assumes that Bel(V jU) takes on all values in [e;E], where e = Bel(;jU)
and E = Bel(U jU). (In Reichenbach's formulation, e = 0 and E = 1.) There are two ways
to interpret this assumption. The weak interpretation is that for each x 2 [0; 1], there exist
U; V such that Bel(V jU) = x. The strong interpretation is that for each U and x, there
exists V such that Bel(V jU) = x. It is not clear which interpretation is intended by Aczel.
Neither one obviously suces to prove that every triple in P is R-constrained, although it
does seem plausible that it might follow from the second assumption.
In any case, neither Aczel nor Reichenbach see a need to check that Equation (7) holds
throughout P . (Nor does Cox for his analogous functional equation, nor do the authors of
more recent and polished presentations of Cox's result, such as Jaynes (1996) and Tribus
(1969).) However, it turns out to be quite necessary to do this. Moreover, it is clear that if
W is nite, there are only nitely tuples in P that are R-constrained, and it is not the case
that all of P is. As we shall see in the next section, this observation has serious consequences
as far as all these proofs are concerned.
3. The Counterexample to Cox's Theorem
The goal of this section is to prove
Theorem 3.1: There is a function Bel
0
, a nite domain W , and functions S, F , and G
satisfying A1, A2, and A3 respectively such that
 Bel
0
(V jU) 2 [0; 1] for U 6= ;,
 S(x) = 1  x (so that S is strictly decreasing and innitely dierentiable),
 G(x; y) = x + y (so that G is strictly increasing in each argument and is innitely
dierentiable),
 F is innitely dierentiable, nondecreasing in each argument in [0; 1]
2
, and strictly in-
creasing in each argument in (0; 1]
2
. Moreover, F is commutative, F (x; 0) = F (0; x) =
0, and F (x; 1) = F (1; x) = x.
However, there is no one-to-one onto function g : [0; 1]! [0; 1] satisfying (1).
Note that the hypotheses on Bel
0
, S, G, and F are at least as strong as those made in all
the other variants of Cox's result, while the assumptions on g are weaker than those made
in the variants. For example, there is no requirement that g be continuous or increasing
nor that g  Bel
0
is a probability distribution (although Paris and Aczel both prove that,
under their assumptions, g can be taken to satisfy all these requirements). This serves to
make the counterexample quite strong.
72
A Counterexample to Theorems of Cox and Fine
The proof of Theorem 3.1 is constructive. Consider a domain W with 12 points:
w
1
; :::; w
12
. We associate with each point w 2W a weight f(w), as follows.
f(w
1
) = 3 f(w
4
) = 5 10
4
f(w
2
) = 2 f(w
5
) = 6 10
4
f(w
3
) = 6 f(w
6
) = 8 10
4
f(w
7
) = 3 10
8
f(w
10
) = 3 10
18
f(w
8
) = 8 10
8
f(w
11
) = 2 10
18
f(w
9
) = 8 10
8
f(w
12
) = 14 10
18
For a subset U of W , we dene f(U) =
P
w2U
f(w). Thus, we can dene a probability
distribution Pr on W by taking Pr(U) = f(U)=f(W ).
Let f
0
be identical to f , except that f
0
(w
10
) = (3   )  10
18
and f
0
(w
11
) = (2 +
)  10
18
, where  is dened below. Again, we extend f
0
to subsets of W by dening
f
0
(U) =
P
w2U
f
0
(w). Let W
0
= fw
10
; w
11
; w
12
g. If U 6= ;, dene
Bel
0
(V jU) =
(
f
0
(V \ U)=f(U) if W
0
 U
f(V \ U)=f(U) otherwise.
Bel
0
is clearly very close to Pr. If U 6= ;, then it is easy to see that jBel
0
(V jU) Pr(V jU)j =
jf
0
(V \ U)  f(V \ U)j=f(U)  . We choose  > 0 so that
if Pr(V jU) > Pr(V
0
jU
0
), then Bel
0
(V jU) > Bel
0
(V
0
jU
0
). (8)
Since the range of Pr is nite, all suciently small  satisfy (8).
The exact choice of weights above is not particularly important. One thing that is
important though is the following collection of equalities:
Pr(w
1
jfw
1
; w
2
g) = Pr(w
10
jfw
10
; w
11
g) = 3=5
Pr(fw
1
; w
2
gjfw
1
; w
2
; w
3
g) = Pr(w
4
jfw
4
; w
5
g) = 5=11
Pr(fw
4
; w
5
gjfw
4
; w
5
; w
6
g) = Pr(fw
7
; w
8
gjfw
7
; w
8
; w
9
g) = 11=19
Pr(w
4
jfw
4
; w
5
; w
6
g) = Pr(fw
10
; w
11
gjfw
10
; w
11
; w
12
g) = 5=19
Pr(w
1
jfw
1
; w
2
; w
3
g) = Pr(w
7
jfw
7
; w
8
g) = 3=11:
(9)
It is easy to check that exactly the same equalities hold if we replace Pr by Bel
0
.
We show that Bel
0
satises the requirements of Theorem 3.1 by a sequence of lemmas.
The rst lemma is the key to showing that Bel
0
cannot be isomorphic to a probability func-
tion. It uses the fact (proved in Lemma 3.3) that if Bel
0
were isomorphic to a probability
function, then there would have to be a function F satisfying A2 that is associative. Al-
though, as is shown in Lemma 3.7, the function F satisfying A2 can be taken to be innitely
dierentiable and increasing in each argument, the equalities in (9) suce to guarantee that
it cannot be taken to be associative, that is, we do not in general have
F (x; F (y; z)) = F (F (x; y); z):
Indeed, there is no associative function F satisfying A2, even if we drop the requirements
that F be dierentiable or increasing.
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Lemma 3.2: For Bel
0
as dened above, there is no associative function F satisfying A2.
Proof: Suppose there were such a function F . From (9), we must have that
F (5=11; 11=19)
= F (Bel
0
(w
4
jfw
4
; w
5
g);Bel
0
(fw
4
; w
5
gjfw
4
; w
5
; w
6
g))
= Bel
0
(w
4
jfw
4
; w
5
; w
6
g) = 5=19
and that
F (3=5; 5=11)
= F (Bel
0
(w
1
jfw
1
; w
2
g);Bel
0
(fw
1
; w
2
gjfw
1
; w
2
; w
3
g))
= Bel
0
(w
1
jfw
1
; w
2
; w
3
g) = 3=11:
It follows that
F (3=5; F (5=11; 11=19)) = F (3=5; 5=19)
and that
F (F (3=5; 5=11); 11=19) = F (3=11; 11=19):
Thus, if F were associative, we would have
F (3=5; 5=19) = F (3=11; 11=19):
On the other hand, from (9) again, we see that
F (3=5; 5=19)
= F (Bel
0
(w
10
jfw
10
; w
11
g);Bel
0
(fw
10
; w
11
gjfw
10
; w
11
; w
12
g))
= Bel
0
(w
10
jfw
10
; w
11
; w
12
g) = (3  )=19;
while
F (3=11; 11=19)
= F (Bel
0
(w
7
jfw
7
; w
8
g);Bel
0
(fw
7
; w
8
gjfw
7
; w
8
; w
9
g))
= Bel
0
(w
7
jfw
7
; w
8
; w
9
g) = 3=19:
It follows that F cannot be associative. ut
To understand how Lemma 3.2 relates to our discussion in Section 2 of the problems
with Reichenbach's proof, we say (x; y; z) is a constrained triple if there exist sets U
1
 U
2

U
3
 U
4
with U
3
6= ; such that x = Bel
0
(U
4
jU
3
), y = Bel
0
(U
3
jU
2
), and z = Bel
0
(U
2
jU
1
).
It is easy to see that A2 forces F to be associative on constrained triples, since if w =
Bel
0
(U
3
jU
1
) and w
0
= Bel
0
(U
4
jU
2
), by A2, we have F (x; F (y; z)) = F (x;w) = Bel
0
(U
4
jU
1
)
and F (F (x; y); z) = F (w
0
; z) = Bel
0
(U
4
; U
1
). A4 says that the set of constrained triples is
dense in [0; 1]
3
.
We similarly dene (x; y) to be a constrained pair if there exist sets U
1
 U
2
 U
3
with U
2
6= ; such that x = Bel
0
(U
3
jU
2
) and y = Bel
0
(U
2
jU
1
). We say that (U
1
; U
2
; U
3
)
corresponds to the constrained pair (x; y). (Note that there may be more than one triple
of sets corresponding to a constrained pair.) If (U
1
; U
2
; U
3
) corresponds to the constrained
pair (x; y) and F satises A2, then we must have F (x; y) = Bel
0
(U
3
jU
1
). Note that both
(3=5; 5=11) and (5=11; 11=19) are constrained pairs, although the triple (3=5; 5=11; 11=19)
is not constrained. It is this fact that we use in Lemma 3.2.
The next lemma shows that Bel
0
cannot be isomorphic to a probability function.
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Lemma 3.3: For Bel
0
as dened above, there is no one-to-one onto function g : [0; 1] !
[0; 1] satisfying (1).
Proof: Suppose there were such a function g. First note that g(Bel
0
(U)) 6= 0 if U 6= ;. For
if g(Bel
0
(U)) = 0, then it follows from (1) that for all V  U , we have
g(Bel
0
(V )) = g(Bel
0
(V jU)) g(Bel
0
(U)) = g(Bel
0
(V jU)) 0 = 0:
Thus, g(Bel
0
(V )) = g(Bel
0
(U)) for all subsets V of U . Since the denition of Bel
0
guarantees
that Bel
0
(V ) 6= Bel
0
(U) if V is a strict subset of U , this contradicts the assumption that g
is one-to-one. Thus, g(Bel
0
(U)) 6= 0 if U 6= ;. It now follows from (1) that if U 6= ;, then
g(Bel
0
(V jU)) = g(Bel
0
(V \ U))=g(Bel
0
(U)): (10)
Now dene F (x; y) = g
 1
(g(x) g(y)). We show that F dened in this way satises A2
and is associative. This will give us a contradiction to Lemma 3.2.
To see that F satises A2, notice that, by applying the observation above repeatedly, if
V \ U 6= ;, we get
F (Bel
0
(V
0
jV \ U);Bel
0
(V jU))
= g
 1
((g(Bel
0
(V
0
jV \ U)) g(Bel
0
(V jU))
= g
 1
((g(Bel
0
(V
0
\ V \ U))=g(Bel
0
(V \ U))) (g(Bel
0
(V \ U))=g(Bel
0
(U))))
= g
 1
(g(Bel
0
(V
0
\ V \ U))=g(Bel
0
(U)))
= g
 1
(g(Bel
0
(V
0
\ V jU)))
= Bel
0
(V
0
\ V jU):
Thus, F satises A2.
To see that F is associative, note that
F (F (x; y); z) = g
 1
(g(g
 1
(g(x)  g(y)))  g(z))
= g
 1
(g(x)  g(y) g(z))
= g
 1
(g(x)  g(g
 1
(g(y)  g(z))))
= F (x; F (y; z)):
This gives us the desired contradiction to Lemma 3.2. It follows that Bel
0
cannot be
isomorphic to a probability function. ut
Despite the fact that Bel
0
is not isomorphic to a probability function, functions S, F , and
G can be dened that satisfy A1, A2, and A3, respectively, and all the other requirements
stated in Theorem 3.1. The argument for S and G is easy; all the work goes into proving
that an appropriate F exists.
Lemma 3.4 : There exists an innitely dierentiable, strictly decreasing function S :
[0; 1] ! [0; 1] such that Bel
0
(V jU) = S(Bel
0
(V jU)) for all sets U; V  W with U 6= ;.
In fact, we can take S(x) = 1  x.
Proof: This is immediate from the observation that Bel
0
(V jU) = 1 Bel
0
(V jU) for U; V 
W . ut
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Lemma 3.5: There exists an innitely dierentiable function G : [0; 1]
2
! [0; 1], increasing
in each argument, such that if U; V; V
0
W , V \V
0
= ;, and U 6= ;, then Bel
0
(V [V
0
jU) =
G(Bel
0
(V jU);Bel
0
(V
0
; U)). In fact, we can take G(x; y) = x+ y.
Proof: This is immediate from the denition of Bel
0
. ut
Thus, all that remains is to show that an appropriate F exists. The key step is provided
by the following lemma, which essentially shows that there is a well dened F that is
increasing.
Lemma 3.6: If U
2
\ U
1
6= ; and V
2
\ V
1
6= ;, then
(a) if Bel
0
(V
3
jV
2
\V
1
)  Bel
0
(U
3
jU
2
\U
1
) and Bel
0
(V
2
jV
1
)  Bel
0
(U
2
jU
1
), then Bel
0
(V
3
\
V
2
jV
1
)  Bel
0
(U
3
\ U
2
jU
1
),
(b) if Bel
0
(V
3
jV
2
\V
1
) < Bel
0
(U
3
jU
2
\U
1
), Bel
0
(V
2
jV
1
)  Bel
0
(U
2
jU
1
), Bel
0
(U
3
jU
2
\U
1
) >
0, and Bel
0
(U
2
jU
1
) > 0, then Bel
0
(V
3
\ V
2
jV
1
) < Bel
0
(U
3
\ U
2
jU
1
),
(c) if Bel
0
(V
3
jV
2
\V
1
)  Bel
0
(U
3
jU
2
\U
1
), Bel
0
(V
2
jV
1
) < Bel
0
(U
2
jU
1
), Bel
0
(U
3
jU
2
\U
1
) >
0, and Bel
0
(U
2
jU
1
) > 0, then Bel
0
(V
3
\ V
2
jV
1
) < Bel
0
(U
3
\ U
2
jU
1
),
Proof: First observe that if Bel
0
(V
3
jV
2
\ V
1
)  Bel
0
(U
3
jU
2
\ U
1
) and Bel
0
(V
2
jV
1
) 
Bel
0
(U
2
jU
1
), then from (8), it follows that Pr(V
3
jV
2
\V
1
)  Pr(U
3
jU
2
\U
1
) and Pr(V
2
jV
1
) 
Pr(U
2
jU
1
). If we have either Pr(V
3
jV
2
\V
1
) < Pr(U
3
jU
2
\U
1
) or Pr(V
2
jV
1
) < Pr(U
2
jU
1
), then
we have either Pr(V
3
\ V
2
jV
1
) < Pr(U
3
\ U
2
jU
1
) or Pr(U
3
jU
2
\ U
1
) = 0 or Pr(U
2
jU
1
) = 0.
It follows that either Bel
0
(V
3
\ V
2
jV
1
) < Bel
0
(U
3
\ U
2
jU
1
) (this uses (8) again) or that
Bel
0
(V
3
\ V
2
jV
1
) = Bel
0
(U
3
\ U
2
jU
1
) = 0. In either case, the lemma holds.
Thus, it remains to deal with the case that Pr(V
3
jV
2
\ V
1
) = Pr(U
3
jU
2
\ U
1
) and
Pr(V
2
jV
1
) = Pr(U
2
jU
1
), and hence Pr(V
3
\ V
2
jV
1
) = Pr(U
3
\ U
2
jU
1
). The details of this
analysis are left to the appendix. ut
Lemma 3.7: There exists a function F : [0; 1]
2
! [0; 1] satisfying all the assumptions of
Theorem 3.1 (with respect to Bel
0
).
Proof: Dene a partial function F
0
on [0; 1]
2
whose domain D consists of all constrained
pairs. For a constrained pair, we dene F
0
in the unique way required to satisfy A2.
A priori, F
0
may not be well dened; it is possible that there exist triples (U
1
; U
2
; U
3
)
and (V
1
; V
2
; V
3
) that both correspond to (x; y) (i.e., x = Bel
0
(U
3
jU
2
) = Bel
0
(V
3
jV
2
) and
y = Bel
0
(U
2
jU
1
) = Bel
0
(V
2
jV
1
)) such that Bel
0
(U
3
jU
1
) 6= Bel
0
(V
3
jV
1
). If this were the case,
then F
0
(x; y) would not be well dened. However, Lemma 3.6 says that this cannot happen.
Moreover, Lemma 3.6 assures us that F
0
is increasing on D, and strictly increasing as long
as one of its arguments is not 0. Indeed, if there is a triple (U
1
; U
2
; U
3
) corresponding to
(x; y) such that fw
10
; w
11
; w
12
g 6 U
1
, then we must have F
0
(x; y) = xy.
The domain D of F
0
is nite. Let D
0
be the commutative closure of D, so that D
0
consists of D and all pairs (y; x) such that (x; y) is in D. Extend F
0
to a commutative
function F
00
on D
0
by dening F
00
(y; x) = F
0
(x; y) if (x; y) 2 D. F
00
is well dened because,
as can easily be veried, if (x; y) and (y; x) are both in D, one of x or y must be 1, and
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F
0
(x; 1) = F
0
(1; x) = x. Clearly F
00
is commutative. It is also increasing. For suppose
(x; y); (x
0
; y
0
) 2 D
0
, x  x
0
, and y  y
0
. If both (x; y) and (x
0
; y
0
) are in D, we must have
F
00
(x; y)  F
00
(x
0
; y
0
), since F
0
is increasing. Similarly, if both (y; x) and (y
0
; x
0
) are in D,
we must have F
00
(x; y) = F
0
(y; x)  F
0
(y
0
; x
0
) = F
00
(x
0
; y
0
). Finally, if (x; y) and (y
0
; x
0
) are
in D, a straightforward check over all possible elements in D shows that this can happen
only if the triples (U
1
; U
2
; U
3
) and (V
1
; V
2
; V
3
) corresponding to (x; y) and (y
0
; x
0
) are such
that fw
10
; w
11
; w
12
g is not a subset of either U
1
or V
1
. It follows that F
0
(x; y) = xy and
F
0
(y
0
; x
0
) = x
0
y
0
, so again we get that F
00
is increasing. A similar argument shows that F
00
is strictly increasing as long as one of its arguments is not 0.
It is straightforward to extend F
00
to a commutative, innitely dierentiable, and in-
creasing function F dened on all of [0; 1]
2
, which is strictly increasing on (0; 1]
2
, and satises
F (x; 1) = F (1; x) = x and F (x; 0) = F (0; x) = 0. We proceed as follows. We rst extend
F
00
so that it is dened for all pairs (x; y) 2 [0; 1]
2
such that x  y so that it has the required
properties. If x < y, we then dene so that F (x; y) = F (y; x). Since F
00
is commutative,
this denition agrees with F
00
(x; y) for x < y. Clearly F is commutative and innitely
dierentiable. To see that F is increasing, suppose that x  x
0
and y  y
0
. Just as in the
case of F
00
, it is immediate that F is increasing if both x  y and x
0
 y
0
or both x < y and
x
0
< y
0
. Otherwise, suppose x  y and y
0
 x
0
. Then we have y  x  x
0
 y
0
. Since F is
increasing on f(x; y) : x  yg, we have F (x; y)  F (x
0
; y)  F (x
0
; x
0
)  F (y
0
; x
0
) = F (x
0
; y
0
).
A similar argument shows that F is strictly increasing unless one its arguments is 0. Finally,
F clearly satises A2, since (by construction) F
0
does, and A2 puts constraints only on the
domain of F
0
. ut
Theorem 3.1 now follows from Lemmas 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7.
4. The Counterexample to Fine's Theorem
Fine is interested in what he calls comparative conditional probability. Thus, rather than
associating a real number with each \conditional object" V jU , he puts an ordering  on
such objects. As usual, V jU  V
0
jU
0
is taken to be an abbreviation for V jU  V
0
jU
0
and
not(V
0
jU
0
 V jU).
Fine is interested in when such an ordering is induced by a real-valued belief function
with reasonable properties. He says that a real-valued function P on such objects agrees
with  if P (V jU)  P (V
0
jU
0
) i V jU  V
0
jU
0
. Fine then considers a number of axioms
that  might satisfy. For our purposes, the most relevant are the ones Fine denotes QCC1,
QCC2, QCC5, and QCC7.
QCC1 just says that  is a linear order:
QCC1. V jU  V
0
jU
0
or V
0
jU
0
 V jU .
QCC2 says that  is transitive:
QCC2. If V
1
jU
1
 V
2
jU
2
and V
2
jU
2
 V
3
jU
3
, then V
1
jU
1
 V
3
jU
3
.
QCC5 is a technical condition involving notions of order topology. The relevant deni-
tions are omitted here (see (Fine, 1973) for details), since QCC5, as Fine observes, holds
vacuously in nite domains (the only ones of interest here).
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QCC5. The set fV jUg has a countable basis in the order topology induced by .
Finally, QCC7 essentially says that  is increasing, in the sense of Lemma 3.6.
QCC7.
(a) If V
3
jV
2
\ V
1
 U
3
jU
2
\ U
1
and V
2
jV
1
 U
2
jU
1
then V
3
\ V
2
jV
1
 U
3
\ U
2
jU
1
.
(b) If V
3
jV
2
\ V
1
 U
2
jU
1
and V
2
jV
1
 U
3
jU
2
\ U
1
then V
3
\ V
2
jV
1
 U
3
\ U
2
jU
1
.
(c) If V
3
jV
2
\ V
1
 U
3
jU
2
\ U
1
, V
2
jV
1
 U
2
jU
1
, and V
2
jV
1
 ;jW , then V
3
\ V
2
jV
1

U
3
\ U
2
jU
1
.
Fine then claims the following theorem:
Fine's Theorem: (Fine, 1973, Chapter II, Theorem 8) If  satises QCC1, QCC2, QCC5,
then there exists some agreeing function P . There exists a function F of two variables such
that
1. P (V \ V
0
jU) = F (P (V
0
jV \ U); P (V jU)),
6
2. F (x; y) = F (y; x),
3. F (x; y) is increasing in x for y > P (;jW ),
4. F (x; F (y; z)) = F (F (x; y); z),
5. F (P (W jU); y) = y,
6. F (P (;jU); y) = P (;jU).
i  also satises QCC7.
The only relevant clauses for our purposes are Clause (1), which is just A2, and Clause
(4), which says that F is associative. As Lemma 3.2 shows, there is no associative function
satisfying A2 for Bel
0
. As I now show, this means that Fine's theorem does not quite hold
either.
Before doing so, let me briey touch on a subtle issue regarding the domain of . In
the counterexample of the previous section, Bel
0
(V jU) is dened as long as U 6= ;. Fine
does not assume that the  relation is necessarily dened on all objects V jU such that
U; V  W and U 6= ;. He assumes that there is an algebra F of subsets of W (that is, a
set of subsets closed under nite intersections and complementation) and a subset F
0
of F
closed under nite intersections and not containing the empty set such that  is dened on
conditional objects V jU such that V 2 F and U 2 F
0
. Since F
0
is closed under intersection
and does not contain the empty set, F
0
cannot contain disjoint sets. If W is nite, then
the only way a collection F
0
can meet Fine's restriction is if there is some nonempty set U
0
such that all elements in F
0
contain U
0
. This restriction is clearly too strong to the extent
that comparative conditional probability is intended to generalize probability. If Pr is a
probability function, then it certainly makes sense to compare Pr(V jU) and Pr(V
0
jU
0
) even
6. Fine assumes that P (V \ V
0
jU) = F (P (V jU); P (V
0
jV \ U)). I have reordered the arguments here for
consistency with Cox's theorem.
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if U and U
0
are disjoint sets. Fine [private communication, 1995] suggested that it might
be better to constrain QCC7 so that we do not condition on events U that are equivalent to
; (where U is equivalent to ; if ;  U and U  ;). Since the only event equivalent to ; in
the counterexample of the previous section is ; itself, this means that the counterexample
can be used without change. This is what is done in the proof below. I show below how to
modify the counterexample so that it satises Fine's original restrictions.
Theorem 4.1: There exists an ordering  satisfying QCC1, QCC2, QCC5, and QCC7,
such that for every function P agreeing with , there is no associative function F of two
variables such that P (V \ V
0
)jU) = F (P (V
0
jV \ U); P (V jU)).
Proof: Let W and Bel
0
be as in the counterexample in the previous section. Dene 
so that Bel
0
agrees with . Thus, V jU  V
0
jU
0
i Bel
0
(V jU)  Bel
0
(V
0
jU
0
). Clearly
 satises QCC1 and QCC2. As was mentioned earlier, since W is nite,  vacuously
satises QCC5. Lemma 3.6 shows that  satises parts (a) and (c) of QCC7. To show that
 also satises part (b) of QCC7, we must prove that if Bel
0
(V
3
jV
2
\V
1
)  Bel
0
(U
2
jU
1
) and
Bel
0
(V
2
jV
1
)  Bel
0
(U
3
jU
2
\ U
1
), then Bel
0
(V
3
\ V
2
jV
1
)  Bel
0
(U
3
\ U
2
jU
1
). The proof of
this is almost identical to that of Lemma 3.6; we simply exchange the roles of Pr(V
2
jV
1
) and
Pr(V
3
jV
2
\V
1
) in that proof. I leave the details to the reader. Lemma 3.2 shows that there is
no associative function F satisfying A2 for Bel
0
. All that was used in the proof was the fact
that Bel
0
satised the inequalities of (9). But these equalities must hold for any function
agreeing with . Thus, exactly the same proof shows that if P is any function agreeing with
, then there is no associative function F satisfying P (V \V
0
jU) = F (P (V
0
jV \U); P (V jU)).
ut
I conclude this section by briey sketching how the counterexample can be modied so
that it satises Fine's original restriction. Redene W by adding one more element w
0
.
Redene f and f
0
so that f(w
0
) = f
0
(w
0
) = 10
 5
; in addition, redene f and f
0
on w
3
, w
6
,
w
9
, and w
12
, so as to decrease their weight by 10
 5
, the weight of w
0
. Thus,
 f(w
3
) = f
0
(w
3
) = 6  10
 5
,
 f(w
6
) = f
0
(w
6
) = 8 10
4
  10
 5
,
 f(w
9
) = f
0
(w
9
) = 8 10
8
  10
 5
, and
 f(w
12
) = f
0
(w
12
) = 14 10
18
  10
 5
.
Finally, redene W
0
to be fw
0
; w
10
; w
11
; w
12
g. The denition of Bel
0
in terms of f , f
0
, and
W
0
remains the same. With these redenitions, the proofs of the previous section go through
essentially unchanged. In particular, the equalities in (9) now hold if we add w
0
to every set.
Let F
0
consist of all subsets of W containing w
0
. Notice that F
0
is closed under intersection
and does not contain the empty set. The lack of associativity in Lemma 3.2 can now be
demonstrated by conditioning on sets in F
0
. As a consequence, we get a counterexample to
Fine's theorem even when restricting to conditional objects that satisfy his restriction.
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5. Discussion
Let me summarize the status of various results in the light of the counterexample of this
paper:
 Cox's theorem as originally stated does not hold in nite domains. Moreover, even
in innite domains, the counterexample and the discussion in Section 2 suggest that
more assumptions are required for its correctness. In particular, the claim in his proof
that F is associative does not follow.
 Although the counterexample given here is not a counterexample to Aczel's theo-
rem, his assumptions do not seem strong enough to guarantee that the function G is
associative, as he claims it is.
 The variants of Cox's theorem stated by Heckerman (1988), Horvitz, Heckerman, and
Langlotz (1986), and Aleliunas (1988) all succumb to the counterexample.
 The claim that the function F must be associative in Fine's theorem is incorrect.
Fine has an analogous result (Fine, 1973, Chapter II, Theorem 4) for unconditional
comparative probability involving a function G as in Aczel's theorem. This function
too is claimed to be associative, and again, this does not seem to follow (although my
counterexample does not apply to that theorem).
Of course, the interesting question now is what it would take to recover Cox's theo-
rem. Paris's assumption A4 suces, as does the stronger assumption of nonatomicity (see
Footnote 4). As we have observed, A4 forces the domain of Bel to be innite, as does the
assumption that the range of Bel is all of [0; 1]. We can always extend a domain to an
innite|indeed, uncountable|domain by assuming that we have an innite collection of
independent fair coins, and that we can talk about outcomes of coin tosses as well as the
original events in the domain. (This type of \extendibility" assumption is fairly standard;
for example, it is made by Savage (1954) in quite a dierent context.) In such an extended
domain, it seems reasonable to also assume that Bel varies uniformly between 0 (certain
falsehood) and 1 (certain truth). If we also assume A4 (or something like it), we can then
recover Cox's theorem. Notice, however, that this viewpoint disallows a notion of belief
that takes on only nitely many gradations.
Another possibility is to observe that we are not interested in just one domain in isola-
tion. Rather, what we are interested in is a notion of belief Bel that applies uniformly to all
domains. Thus, even if (U; V ) and (U
0
; V
0
) are pairs of subsets of dierent (perhaps even
disjoint) domains, if Bel(V jU) and Bel(V
0
jU
0
) are both 1=2, then we would expect this to
denote the same relative strength of belief. In this setting, an analogue of A4 seems more
reasonable. That is, we can assume that for all 0  ; ;   1 and  > 0, there is some
domain W and subsets U
1
, U
2
, U
3
, and U
4
of W such that the conclusion of A4 holds. If
we further assume that the functions F , G, and S are also uniform across domains (that is,
that A1, A2, and A3 hold for the same choice of F , G, and S in every domain), then we
can again recover Cox's theorem.
7
7. This point was independently observed by Je Paris [private communication, 1996].
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The idea of having a notion of uncertainty that applies uniformly in all domains seems
implicit in some discussion in that Jaynes' recent book on probability theory (1996). Jaynes
focuses almost exclusively on nite domains.
8
As he says \In principle, every problem must
start with such nite set probabilities; extensions to innite sets is permitted only when
this is the result of a well-dened and well-behaved limiting process from a nite set." To
make sense of this limiting process, it seems that Jaynes must be assuming that the same
notion of uncertainty applies in all domains. Moreover, one can make arguments appealing
to continuity that when we consider such limiting processes, we can always nd subsets U
1
,
U
2
, U
3
, and U
4
in some suciently rich (but nite) extension of the original domain such
that A4 holds.
While this seems like perhaps the most reasonable additional assumptions required to
get Cox's result, it does require us to consider many domains at once. Moreover, it does
not allow a notion of belief that has only nitely many gradations, let alone a notion of
belief that allows some events to be considered incomparable in likelihood.
9
Suppose we really are interested in one particular nite domain, and we do not want
to extend it or consider all other possible domains. What assumptions do we then need
to get Cox's theorem? The counterexample given here could be circumvented by requiring
that F be associative on all tuples (rather than just on the constrained triples). However, if
we really are interested in a single domain, the motivation for making requirements on the
behavior of F on belief values that do not arise is not so clear. Moreover, it is far from clear
that assuming that F is associative suces to prove the theorem. For example, Cox's proof
makes use of various functional equations involving F and S, analogous to the equation (7)
that appears in Section 2. These functional equations are easily seen to hold for certain
tuples. However, as we saw in Section 2, the proof really requires that they hold for all
tuples. Just assuming that F is associative does not appear to suce to guarantee that the
functional equations involving S hold for all tuples. Further assumptions appear necessary.
Nir Friedman [private communication] has conjectured that the following condition,
which says that essentially all beliefs are distinct, suces:
 if ;  U  V , ;  U
0
 V
0
, and (U; V ) 6= (U
0
; V
0
), then Bel(U jV ) 6= Bel(U
0
jV
0
).
Even if this condition suces, note that it precludes, for example, a uniform probability
distribution, and thus again seems unduly restrictive.
Another possibly interesting line of research is that of characterizing the functions that
satisfy Cox's assumptions. As the example given here shows, the class of such functions
includes functions that are not isomorphic to any probability function. I conjecture that in
fact it includes only functions that are in some sense \close" to a function isomorphic to a
probability distribution, although it is not clear exactly how \close" should be dened (nor
how interesting this class really is in practice).
So what does all this say regarding the use of probability? Not much. Although I
have tried to argue here that Cox's justication of probability is not quite as strong as
8. Actually, Jaynes assigns probability to propositions, not sets, but, as noted earlier, there is essentially
no dierence between the two.
9. Interestingly, Jaynes (1996, Appendix A) admits that having plausibility values be elements of a partially-
ordered lattice may be a reasonable alternative to traditional probability theory. Nir Friedman and I
(1995, 1996, 1997) have recently developed such a theory and shown that it provides a useful basis for
thinking about default reasoning and belief revision.
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previously believed, and the assumptions underlying the variants of it need clarication,
I am not trying to suggest that probability should be abandoned. There are many other
justications for its use.
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Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 3.6
Recall that all that remains in the proof of Lemma 3.6 is to deal with the case that Pr(V
3
jV
2
\
V
1
) = Pr(U
3
jU
2
\U
1
) and Pr(V
2
jV
1
) = Pr(U
2
jU
1
), and hence Pr(V
3
\V
2
jV
1
) = Pr(U
3
\U
2
jU
1
).
Before proceeding with the proof, it is useful to collect some general facts about Pr. A set
U is said to be standard if U is a subset of one of fw
1
; w
2
; w
3
g, fw
4
; w
5
; w
6
g, fw
7
; w
8
; w
9
g, or
fw
10
; w
11
; w
12
g. A real number a is said to be relevant if there exists some standard U and
some arbitrary V such that a = Pr(V jU). Notice that even if U 6= ; is nonstandard, then,
taking U
0
to be the standard subset of U which has the greatest weight, then jPr(V jU)  
Pr(V jU
0
)j < :002. (This is the reason that the weights are multiplied by factors such as
10
4
, 10
8
, and 10
18
.) Thus, for any subsets V and U of W , we have that Pr(V jU) is close to
a relevant number (where \close" means \within .002").
Call a triple (U; V; V
0
) of subsets of W good if Bel
0
(V
0
\ V jU) = Bel
0
(V
0
jV \ U) 
Bel
0
(V jU). Clearly if both (U
1
; U
2
; U
3
) and (V
1
; V
2
; V
3
) are good, then the lemma holds.
Notice that if (U; V; V
0
) is not good, then U  fw
10
; w
11
; w
12
g and f(V \fw
10
; w
11
; w
12
g) 6=
f
0
(V \ fw
10
; w
11
; w
11
g), which means that V \ fw
10
; w
11
; w
12
g must contain one of w
10
and
w
11
, but not both, and thus must be one of fw
10
g, fw
11
g, fw
10
; w
12
g, or fw
11
; w
12
g.
Thus, we may as well assume that at least one of (U
1
; U
2
; U
3
) or (V
1
; V
2
; V
3
) is not good.
In that case, I claim that one of the following must hold:
 Bel
0
(V
3
\ V
2
jV
1
) = Bel(V
3
jV
2
\ V
1
) = Bel
0
(U
3
jU
2
\ U
1
) = Bel
0
(U
3
\ U
2
jU
1
) = 0
 U
3
\ U
2
\ U
1
= U
2
\ U
1
and V
3
\ V
2
\ V
1
= V
2
\ V
1
 f(U
1
) = f(V
1
) and f(U
1
\ U
2
) = f(V
1
\ V
2
)
In the rst case, we have already seen that the lemma holds. In the second case, we have
Bel
0
(V
3
\ V
2
jV
1
) = Bel
0
(V
2
jV
1
), Bel
0
(U
3
\ U
2
jU
1
) = Bel
0
(U
2
jU
1
), and Bel
0
(V
3
jV
2
\ V
1
) =
Bel
0
(U
3
jU
2
\U
1
) = 1, so the lemma is easily seen to hold. Finally, in the third case, notice
that since Pr(U
2
\ U
3
jU
1
) = Pr(V
2
\ V
3
jV
1
), we must also have that f(U
1
\ U
2
\ U
3
) =
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f(V
1
\V
2
\V
3
). Moreover, it is easy to see that all these equalities must hold if f is replaced
by f
0
. Again, the lemma immediately follows.
To prove the claim, for deniteness, assume that (U
1
; U
2
; U
3
) is not good (an identical
argument works if (V
1
; V
2
; V
3
) is not good). From the characterization above of triples that
are not good, it follows that f(U
1
\ U
2
) = a  10
18
+ b and f(U
1
) = 19  10
18
+ c, where
a 2 f2; 3; 16; 17g (depending on U
2
\fw
10
; w
11
; w
12
g), and both b; c < 20 10
8
. Clearly, the
relevant number closest to Pr(U
2
jU
1
) is a=19. Since Pr(V
2
jV
1
) = Pr(U
2
jU
1
) by assumption,
Pr(V
2
jV
1
) is also close to a=19. Thus, we must have that f(V
1
\ V
2
) = a  10
k
+ b
0
and
f(V
1
) = 1910
k
+c
0
, where k 2 f0; 4; 8; 18g. In fact, it is easy to see that k is either 8 or 18,
since there are no relevant numbers of the form a=19 (for a 2 f2; 3; 16; 17g) that are close
to Pr(V jU) if U  fw
1
; w
2
; w
3
; w
4
; w
5
; w
6
g. In addition, if k = 18, then b
0
; c
0
< 20  10
8
,
while if k = 8, then b
0
; c
0
< 20 10
4
. By standard arithmetic manipulation, we have that
10
18
(ac
0
  19b
0
) + 10
k
(19b   ac) + (bc
0
  b
0
c) = 0:
If k = 8, then it is easy to see that we must have
ac
0
  19b
0
= 0, 19b  ac = 0 and bc
0
  b
0
c = 0, (11)
while if k = 18, then we must have
19(b   b
0
) + a(c
0
  c) = 0 and bc
0
  b
0
c = 0. (12)
Now comes a case analysis. First suppose that k = 8. Then we must have b
0
= c
0
= 0,
since if c
0
6= 0, then from (11) we have that b
0
=c
0
= a=19, and it is easy to see that there
do not exist sets T
1
and T
2
such that f(T
1
) = b
0
, f(T
2
) = c
0
, and b
0
=c
0
= a=19, with
b
0
; c
0
 20  10
4
. Thus, it follows that Pr(U
2
jU
1
) = Pr(V
2
jV
1
) = a=19. Moreover, we must
have V
1
= fw
7
; w
8
; w
9
g and V
2
\V
1
either fw
7
g or fw
8
; w
9
g, depending on a. It follows that
Pr(V
3
jV
2
\ V
1
) must be one of f0; 1=2; 1g. Since Pr(U
3
jU
2
\ U
1
) = Pr(V
3
jV
2
\ V
1
), we must
have that Pr(U
3
jU
2
\U
1
) 2 f0; 1=2; 1g. Since U
2
\U
1
contains exactly one of w
10
and w
11
, it
is easy to see that Pr(U
3
jU
2
\U
1
) cannot be 1=2. If Pr(U
3
jU
2
\U
1
) = Pr(V
3
jV
2
\V
1
) = 0, then
U
3
\U
2
\U
1
= V
3
\V
2
\V
1
= ;, and we must have Bel
0
(U
3
\U
2
jU
1
) = Bel
0
(V
3
\V
2
jV
1
) = 0,
so the claim follows. On the other hand, if Pr(U
3
jU
2
\ U
1
) = Pr(V
3
jV
2
\ V
1
) = 1, then
U
3
\ U
2
\ U
1
= U
2
\ U
1
and V
3
\ V
2
\ V
1
= V
2
\ V
1
, and the claim again follows.
Now suppose k = 18. If c = c
0
, then by (12), we must have that b = b
0
. It immediately
follows that f(U
1
) = f(V
1
) and f(U
1
\ U
2
) = f(V
1
\ V
2
), so the claim holds. Thus, we can
suppose c 6= c
0
. Suppose that c 6= 0 (an identical argument works if c 6= 0). Then there
exists some x 6= 1 such that c = xc
0
. Since bc
0
  b
0
c = 0, it follows that b = xb
0
. Substituting
xb
0
for b and xc
0
for c in (12), we get that (1  x)b
0
=(1  x)c
0
= a=19, from which it follows
that b
0
=c
0
= a=19. Moreover, we also get that either b = c = 0 or b=c = a=19. It is easy to
check that a must be either 3 or 16. If b=c = a=19, then we must have b = b
0
and c = c
0
.
As we have seen, this suces to prove the claim. Thus, we can assume that b = c = 0. But
this means that U
1
= fw
10
; w
11
; w
12
g, and that U
1
\ U
2
is either fw
10
g or fw
11
; w
12
g. It
follows that the only possibilities for Pr(U
3
jU
2
\ U
1
) are 0, 1=8, 7=8, or 1. It is easy to see
that Pr(V
3
jV
2
\V
1
) cannot be 1=8 or 7=8, while the cases where it is either 0 or 1 are easily
taken care of, as above.
This completes the proof of the claim and of the lemma. ut
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